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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a firm-level panel data of Chinese listed firms, this paper examines the effects of state 
control on firm value and the different impacts that have under different degree of marketization 
deeply. The results show: compared with non-state controlled firms, state controlled firms are 
imposed by much policy burden and have more serious tunneling or expropriation behaviors. 
Therefore, firm values in state controlled firms are lower than in non-state controlled firms. For 
state controlled firms, the lower the government administrative ranks, the more serious the 
intervention or expropriation behaviors imposed by government, and thus the lower the firm value. 
Compared with low marketization regions, the negative effects of state control and low 
government administrative rank control on firm value is relatively smaller in regions with high 
degree of marketization.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many firms are controlled by the state in emerging countries, like in China (La Porta et al., 1999; Sun and 
Tong, 2003). The importance of firm value has received considerable attention in academic research as well as in 
business practices. However, most of the researches often study the impacts of firm basic or governance 
characteristics on firm value just from the perspective of firm microscopic characteristics, ignoring the government 
behavior and the macro institutional environment. The effects of government on society and economy are much 
more significant in transition economy countries than in western developed countries since they typically have great 
social and economic resources (Chen, Lee and Li, 2008). The governments, especially local governments in China, 
often intervene in firms according to their private benefits, and exert much policy burdens on their controlled firms. 
They often affect the resource allocation by a “visible hand” (Chen, Lee and Li, 2008) in the pursuit of social and/or 
political gains rather than the economic objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Taboada，2011). Therefore, the firms 
whether controlled by state or controlled by different government administrative ranks will be different at firm 
values. 
 
Despite the same legal origin, the degree of marketization varies widely among different regions in China 
due to different histories, natural environments, regional economic development choices, and social or cultural 
factors (Fan, Wang and Zhu, 2010). Regional marketization differences within China provide an unique setting to 
explore the impacts of state control on firm value under different marketization environments. 
 
This paper combines the method of state control with marketization to study their effects on firm value. 
Specifically, this paper aimed to answer the following three questions: (1) Compared with non-state controlled firms, 
how about the effects of state control on firm value? (2) For state controlled firms, how about the effects of different 
administrative ranks of government control on firm value? (3) Do the above effects differ under various degrees of 
marketization regions? 
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2. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The target of the establishment of China's security markets was for the reform of state controlled firms (Liu 
and Lu, 2007). Consequently, state ownership accounted for approximately 70% of the total businesses in 2006 (Zou 
and Xiao, 2006). In China, the state controlled firms are always intervened by the government and take too much 
policy burdens imposed by government, such as the goal of employment, taxation, economic development, social 
stability or official promotion goals (Lin, Cai and Li, 1998; Yin, 2001; Li and Xia, 2008). The state controlled firms 
will change their operating behaviors while relating to the government’s various political or social goals, which will 
lead to the deviation from the goal of maximizing firm value. Previous studies have found that the more intervention 
behaviors by the government, the more serious of the tunneling behavior and the lower of the firm values (Xu and 
Wang, 1999; Chen, Firth and Rui, 2006). Lo et al.(2010) find that the profit of state controlled firms is more likely to 
shift out and the tunneling effect will increase with the proportion of state ownership (Shan, 2013). In state 
controlled firms, even there exist government assisting behaviors, the ultimate goal are to serve for the grabbing 
behaviors (Li, Yu and Wang, 2005). Meanwhile, external regulatory or legal mechanisms are difficult to constrain 
the government tunneling behaviors, while relatively effective in restricting the entrenchment behaviors in non-state 
controlled firms. Compared with state controlled firms, the tunneling behaviors in non-state controlled firms are 
relatively lower (Zhu, 2006). Therefore, we have the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Compared with non-state controlled firms, the firm values are relatively lower in state controlled 
firms. 
 
 Under China’s present political system, local governments are likely to be the agents of the central 
government and governments at different administrative ranks have different intervention extents in their controlled 
firms (Chen et al., 2008). Local governments are more likely to intervene in their controlled firms for short-term 
benefits. However, in central government controlled firms, the government intervention would be relatively lower 
due to the stringent regulation by many departments (Xu, 2004; Chen, Firth and Xu, 2009; Wang and Xiao, 2009). 
Generally speaking, the higher the government administrative ranks, the more attention paid to their reputation, 
which could restrain the government’s grabbing behaviors and reduce the government intervention (Liu, Mao & 
Yue, 2008). In addition, the fiscal decentralization reform since 1994 induces the fiscal revenue flowing into the 
central government overfull in China. The local governments have large duty to the social affairs, but with no 
corresponding fiscal revenue guarantee, especially for city or county governments (Yin, Chen and Pan, 2006). 
Therefore, the lower the government administrative rank, the larger the fiscal burden will be, and the more 
motivated to intervene in their controlled firms to alleviate the fiscal burden and achieve employment goals. 
Therefore, compared with central government, local governments have larger motivation to intervene in and tunnel 
their controlled firms. The lower the government administrative ranks, the stronger the intervention behaviors. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: For state controlled firms, the lower the government administrative ranks, the lower the firm value of 
their controlled firms. 
 
 Institutional environment, especially degree of Marketization is an inherent external governance 
mechanism (Wei et al., 2011). China began its transition from a centrally planned system to a market economy since 
1978, and the ensuring market-oriented reforms have resulted in decisive progress but also a widening regional 
disparity within the country (Wei et al., 2011). Marketization is the degree of allocating economic resources 
dominant by the market. Marketization plays a very important role in corporate governance system and can affect 
firm behaviors directly and indirectly through affecting various governance mechanisms. In regions with low degree 
of marketization, due to the imperfect legal environment and supervision mechanisms, the constraint effects on 
government intervention are relatively small. Thus, the governments, especially the low administrative rank 
government’s grabbing behaviors are relatively more convenient in low degree of marketization regions. While in 
high degree of marketization regions, the legal environment is relatively perfect, tunneling behavior is effectively 
curbed as the cost of the government intervention or tunneling behavior greatly increase and expropriation is more 
likely to be exposed and punished, which will reduce the government intervention or expropriation behaviors and 
protect the interests of outside investors (Wei et al., 2011). The improvement of regional marketization can weaken 
the motivation and extent of local government intervention behaviors, and alleviate the policy burdens imposed by 
governments (Liu, Tian and Wang, 2011). Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3: Compared with low degree of marketization regions, the negative impact of state control on firm 
value is relatively smaller in high degree of marketization regions. 
 
Hypothesis 4: For state controlled firms, compared with low degree of marketization regions, the negative impact of 
low administrative rank of governments on firm value is relatively smaller in high degree of marketization regions. 
 
3. METHODS 
 
3.1 Data Collection And Sample 
 
 All the listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange market are selected as our original samples 
over the period of 2007-2012. They were excluded from our sample if they are: (1) firms in financial industry; (2) 
ST (special treatment), PT (particular transfer) firms, since they are under the special financial situations. (3) firms 
with extreme variable values, like those with debt ratio either greater than 1 or smaller than 0, and those with growth 
either greater than 2 or smaller than -0.5; (4) firms with uncompleted data. After the selection process, we obtain 
7102 firm-year observations, with 1061 observations in 2007, 1159 observations in 2008, 1131 observations in 
2009, 1152 observations in 2010, 1281 observations in 2011, and 1318 observations in 2012. The relevant data of 
state control are manually collected from the annual reports of listed firms, and the other data in this study come 
from CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database),  which is the most widely used database 
on China’s capital market (Su, Yang and Yang,2010; Su and Li, 2013). 
 
3.2 Measures 
 
3.2.1 Dependent Measure 
 
 Based on previous studies, we use Tobin's Q to measure firm value, which is equivalent to the firm market 
value divided by total assets. In China, since there are tradable shares and non-tradable shares, we calculate the firm 
market value as the sum of total liability, market value of tradable shares and the book value of non-tradable shares.  
 
3.2.2 Independent Measures 
 
 According to the analysis above, independent measures in this research include whether controlled by the 
state, government administrative ranks and the degree of marketization. By tracing the controlling chains of the 
listed firms, we find out the ultimate controller. According to the nature of the ultimate controller, we divide the 
sample into state controlled firms and non-state controlled firms. For state controlled firms, we divide them into 
three types based on the government administrative ranks according to the type of ultimate controllers: central 
government controlled firms, provincial government controlled firms, and city or county (or even more lower 
administrative rank) government controlled firms. If the state ultimate controller of a listed firm is a university, then 
the rank of the government controller of the firm is determined by the university’s subordination. If firms are 
controlled by the central government, the variable of the government administrative rank is 1; when firms are 
controlled by the provincial government, the variable is 2; and when firms are controlled by the city or county 
government, the variable is 3. We measure the degree of marketization of different regions that listed firms are 
registered in China as proposed by Fan et al. (2010) in the book “NERI Index of Marketization of China’s 
Provinces”, which have been used in previous studies (Wang, Wong and Xia, 2008; Li, Yue and Zhao, 2009). The 
larger the index value, the higher the degree of marketization. 
 
3.2.3 Other Measures 
 
 Based on previous studies, we introduce the following control variables: (1) Firm size. Firm size is used to 
control its potential impact on firm value, which is measured by the natural logarithm of total asset of a firm at the 
end of the fiscal period. (2) Capital structure. We use asset-liability ratio to control the impact of debt on firm value. 
(3) Growth. We use the growth rate of sales to control the impact of growth on firm value. (4) Ownership 
concentration. Different ownership concentration represents different agency problems, and thus will affect the firm 
value. (5) Dual of chairman and CEO. When the two positions are the same person, the independence of the boards 
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would be affected seriously, which will affect firm value further. (6) Industry. According to the “industry 
classification standard” issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2001, the listed firms are divided into 
13 broad industries. This paper further classifies the manufacturing industry (a predominant of the listed firms) into 
ten sub-categories in terms of the second-code classification criteria. After deleting the financial industry, the sample 
of this study consists of 21 industries. Taking the industry of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery as 
the benchmark, 20 dummy variables are used to represent the industries. When listed firm belongs to a particular 
industry, the industry dummy variable takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, the sample period is from 
2007 to 2012, so we take the year of 2007 as the benchmark, and select five dummy variables to represent the years. 
 
 The definitions of variables are summarized in Table 1:  
 
Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variable 
Type 
Name Label Definition and computation 
Dependent  
variable 
Firm value Tobin's Q 
(Total liability+Market value of tradable share +net asset per 
share* 
non-tradable share)/Total assets 
Independen
t variable 
Whether controlled by state STATE 
1 when the ultimate controller’s property right is state, 0 
otherwise  
Government administrative 
rank 
GOVR 
1 when the firm controlled by central government, 2 when  
controlled by provincial government, 3 when controlled by 
city  
or county government 
Degree of Marketization MAR 
the marketization process index scores proposed by Fan et 
al.(2010) 
Control  
Variable 
Firm size SIZE ㏑(Total assets) 
Capital structure LEV Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
Growth GROWTH 
（sales of this period- sales of last period）/ sales of last 
period 
Ownership concentration BSE The biggest shareholder’s equity 
Dual of the chairman and CEO DUAL 1 when the chairman and CEO is one person, 0 otherwise 
Industry dummy INDUSTRYj 1 when the firm belongs to industry j, 0 otherwise 
Year dummy YEARk 1 when the year is k, 0 otherwise 
 
3.3 Regression Models 
 
 To test those hypotheses proposed above, we adopt the following regression models. Model (1) is used to 
test the H1 and H2. Variable Xit stands for the variables of whether controlled by state and government 
administrative ranks. This study predicts that the coefficient β1 of Xit is significantly smaller than 0. Model (2) is 
used to test H3 and H4. We expect that β2, the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly greater than 0. 
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 In the models above, 0 represents the intercept item,   represents the regression coefficients,   denotes 
the error term, subscript i and t represent firm and time respectively.  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis And The Mean Difference Test 
 
 The descriptive statistics results of main variables for the sample and the t-test for the mean value 
difference are shown in table 2. As we can see from the table, the sample of the state controlled firms is 4825, while 
the sample of non-state controlled firms is 2277, the proportion of state controlled sample is 67.94%. The mean 
value of Tobin's Q in state controlled firms is 1.5607, while the mean value in non-state controlled firms is 1.8219, 
and a significant difference from the t-test result of the mean difference, indicating that compared with non-state 
controlled firms, the firm value is relatively lower in state controlled firms, which is consistent with H1. Government 
administrative rank has an overall mean of 2.0711, which indicates that the number of listed firms controlled by the 
central government and those controlled by city or county government are approximately the same. The mean of 
marketization in state controlled firms is 8.2720, while the mean in non-state controlled firms is 8.8414, and a 
significant difference between them, indicating that non-state controlled firms account for a larger proportion in 
more developed regions. From the control variables, we can see that except for growth, the mean of all the other 
variables are significantly different between the two kinds of firms.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Mean Value T-test 
Variable Property Right Obs. Min. Max. Mean SD. Var. T-test 
Tobin's Q 
State 4825 0.7341 16.3983 1.5607 0.8328 0.6936 -0.2613*** 
Non-state 2277 0.7720 14.4621 1.8219 1.1558 1.3358 （-9.6674） 
GOVR State 4825 1.0000 3.0000 2.0711 0.8194 0.6714  
MAR 
State 4825 1.5500 11.7100 8.2720 2.0278 4.1122 -0.5695*** 
Non-state 2277 1.5500 11.7100 8.8414 2.0887 4.3628 （-10.8232） 
SIZE 
State 4825 18.2659 28.0031 21.7390 1.1445 1.3099 0.5893*** 
Non-state 2277 18.3224 24.9478 21.1497 0.9071 0.8228 （23.4250） 
LEV 
State 4825 0.0081 0.9824 0.5031 0.1794 0.0322 0.0242*** 
Non-state 2277 0.0178 0.9938 0.4789 0.1834 0.0336 （5.2781） 
GROWTH 
State 4825 -0.4927 1.9877 0.1809 0.2976 0.0885 0.0081 
Non-state 2277 -0.4977 1.9292 0.1728 0.3387 0.1147 （0.9786） 
BSE 
State 4825 6.4700 86.4200 41.1279 15.9036 252.9244 8.5125*** 
Non-state 2277 4.4900 85.2300 32.6154 13.5380 183.2764 （23.3496） 
DUAL 
State 4825 0.0000 1.0000 0.0926 0.2900 0.0841 -0.1037*** 
Non-state 2277 0.0000 1.0000 0.1963 0.3973 0.1578 （-11.1307） 
Notes：The values in ( ) are t-statistic. The values upon ( ) are the difference of the two kinds of samples’ mean value and the 
significance of the t-test. *，**，*** represent significant at the 10％，5％ and 1％level, respectively.  
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
 The Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables are shown in table 3. The variable of whether 
controlled by the state is negatively related to Tobin's Q, and the coefficient is significant at the 1% level, implying 
that listed firms controlled by the state have relatively lower firm value than firms controlled by non-state entities, 
which is consistent with H1. The variable that represents government administrative rank is negatively related to 
Tobin's Q, and the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. The lower the government administrative rank, the lower 
the firm value of their controlled firms, which is consistent with H2. The variable of marketization is significantly 
positively related to firm value, indicating that the firm value is relatively higher in regions with high degree of 
marketization. Relationships between other control variables and Tobin's Q are as expected. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Analysis 
 Tobin's Q STATE GOVR MAR SIZE LEV GROWTH BSE DUAL 
Tobin's Q 1.0000         
STATE -0.1275*** 1.0000        
GOVR -0.0708***  1.0000       
MAR 0.1125*** -0.1287*** -0.0359** 1.0000      
SIZE -0.1896*** 0.2481*** -0.1502*** 0.1029*** 1.0000     
LEV -0.2225*** 0.0625*** 0.0547*** -0.0312*** 0.3018*** 1.0000    
GROWTH 0.0028 0.0122 -0.0392*** -0.0604*** 0.0996*** 0.0619*** 1.0000   
BSE -0.1549*** 0.2531*** -0.0962*** -0.0357*** 0.2460*** -0.0321*** 0.0917*** 1.0000  
DUAL 0.0679*** -0.1459*** 0.1128*** 0.0642*** -0.0973*** -0.0563*** -0.0253** -0.0681*** 1.0000 
Note; *, **, *** represent significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
 The results of multiple regression analysis are shown in table 4. The F value of each model is significant at 
the 1% level, which shows that the overall fit degree of each model is relatively well. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) testing the severity of multi-collinearity is far less than 10, and the value of the tolerance is far larger than 0.1 
(Due to space limitation, the VIF values and tolerance of each variables are not listed in the table), which also 
suggest that the problem of multi-collinearity does not exist in these models. The D.W values of each regression 
equation are all around 2, which implying that the autocorrelation problem is not serious here.  
 
 It can be seen from columns (1) in Table 4 that the variable whether controlled by the state is significantly 
negatively related to firm value, suggesting that state controlled firms are imposed much more policy burden by 
governments and have more serious tunneling or expropriation behaviors. Therefore, compared with non-state 
controlled firms, the firm values are relatively lower in state controlled firms, which support H1. In column (2) of 
table 4, the estimated coefficient on the variable of whether controlled by the state is still negative, but the 
interaction of the degree of marketization with the variable of whether controlled by the state is significantly 
positively related to firm value. Thus the positive coefficient on the interaction term implies that in regions with a 
higher degree of marketization, state control plays a relatively weaker role in firm value than in regions with a lower 
degree of marketization. The negative impact of state control on firm value is relatively smaller in high degree of 
marketization regions than in low degree of marketization regions. So, H3 is supported. 
 
 Column (3) in Table 4 indicates that the variable that represents government administrative rank is 
significantly negatively related to firm value. Since larger values of the variable represent a lower administrative 
rank of government, the result implies that the lower the government administrative rank, the stronger the 
motivation for the government to intervene and tunnel their controlled firms, which reduced firm value. Therefore, 
H2 is supported. In column (4), the estimated coefficient on government administrative rank is still negative, but the 
interaction term of the degree of marketization with the government administrative rank is significantly positively 
related to firm value. Thus the positive coefficient on the interaction term implies that in regions with a higher 
degree of marketization, government administrative rank plays a relatively weaker role in firm value than in regions 
with a lower degree of marketization, which support H4.  
 
 Based on the analysis of control variables in Tables 4, we generate the following statements: Firm size is 
significantly negatively related to firm value. It means that the larger the firm size, the lower the firm value. Capital 
structure also displays a significantly negative relationship with firm value, which shows that the higher the debt 
level, the lower the firm value. Growth is significantly positively related to firm value, suggesting that high growth 
can lead to high firm value. Ownership concentration and firm value is significantly negatively related, indicating 
that high concentration equity structure reduced the firm value in China. In the total sample, dual of the chairman 
and CEO doesn’t have significant impact on firm value. While in state controlled sample, dual of the chairman and 
CEO has significantly positive impact on firm value. There are large differences in firm value among different 
industries or years. 
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Table 4: Regression Results 
  Tobin's Q 
Variable Expected sign （1） （2） （3） （4） 
Constant ? 
5.0895*** 5.1684*** 4.8400*** 4.9287*** 
（26.0171） （25.8932） （23.1989） （23.1129） 
STATE - 
-0.0401** -0.1355***   
（-1.9603） （-2.5891）   
MARSTATE + 
 0.0115**   
 （1.9800）   
GOVR - 
  -0.0865*** -0.1255*** 
  （-7.2328） （-5.4860） 
MARGOVR + 
   0.0046** 
   （1.9970） 
SIZE - 
-0.1574*** -0.1602*** -0.1434*** -0.1461*** 
（-16.7724） （-16.8841） （-14.9522） （-15.0891） 
LEV - 
-0.7800*** -0.7734*** -0.6897*** -0.6810*** 
（-14.5144） （-14.3682） （-12.1426） （-11.9571） 
GROWTH + 
0.2039*** 0.2072*** 0.1871*** 0.1907*** 
（6.9899） （7.0908） （5.8278） （5.9322） 
BSE - 
-0.0037*** -0.0038*** -0.0022*** -0.0023*** 
（-6.0456） （-6.1002） （-3.5151） （-3.6018） 
DUAL - 
0.0400 0.0408 0.0942*** 0.0949*** 
（1.4848） （1.5120） （2.9374） （2.9601） 
INDUSTRY  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
YEAR  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Adjust R2  0.4045 0.4047 0.4184 0.4187 
F value  156.5651*** 151.8576*** 116.6567*** 113.0926*** 
D.W value  1.9344 1.9357 1.9326 1.9349 
Obs  7102 7102 4825 4825 
Note:  the number in the（ ）represents t value; *, **, *** represent significant at the 10％，5％ and 1％ level, respectively. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
 This study investigates the impacts of state control on firm value and the differences of that impact among 
regions with different degree of marketization deeply. From a sample of 7102 listed firms from 2007 to 2012 in 
China, we found that the state commonly intervenes in listed firms and reduced firm value, and the improvement of 
marketization helps to mitigate the impact of state control on firm value. Specifically, our results show that the state 
often imposes much policy burden on their controlled firms and tunnel them for private benefits. Therefore, 
compared with non-state controlled firms, the firm values are relatively lower in state controlled firms. For state 
controlled firms, the lower the government administrative rank, the stronger the motivation for them to intervene in 
and tunnel their controlled firms, and therefore the lower the firm values in their controlled firms. However, the cost 
to the state of intervention is higher in regions with high degree of marketization than in regions with less-developed 
regions. With the improvement of marketization, the negative effects of state control on firm value declines 
gradually. Simar to the above, for state controlled firms, the negative impact of low rank governments on firm value 
is relatively smaller in high degree of marketization regions than in low degree of marketization regions. The results 
show that state control especially low administrative ranks of governments have significantly negative impacts on 
firm value, while the improvement of marketization can mitigate the negative effects. 
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